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Abstract
We study a Stackelberg type symmetric dynamic three-players zero-sum
game. One player is the leader and two players are followers. All players
have symmetric payoff functions. The game is a two-stages game. In the
first stage the leader determines the value of its strategic variable. In the
second stage the followers determine the values of their strategic variables
given the value of the leader’s strategic variable. On the other hand, in the
static game all players simultaneously determine the values of their strate-
gic variables. We show that if and only if the game is fully symmetric, the
Stackelberg equilibrium and the static equilibrium are equivalent.
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1 Introduction
It is known that in a two-person zero-sum game the equilibrium of the Stackel-
berg type dynamic game and that of the static game are equivalent. Please see,
for example, Korzhyk et. al. (2014), Ponssard and Zamir (1973), Tanaka (2014)
and Yin et. al. (2010). We examine this problem in a three-players zero-sum
game, and show that the equilibrium of the Stackelberg type dynamic game and
that of the static game are equivalent if and only if the game is fully symmetric.
In the next section we show the main result. All players have symmetric pay-
off functions. One player is the leader and two players are followers. The game
is a two-stages game as follows;
1. In the first stage the leader determines the value of its strategic variable.
2. In the second stage the followers determine the values of their strategic
variables given the value of the leader’s strategic variable.
On the other hand, in the static game all players simultaneously determine the
values of their strategic variables. We show that if and only if the game is fully
symmetric, the equilibrium of the Stackelberg type dynamic game and that of
the static game are equivalent.
As we will show in Section 3 using a model of relative profit maximization in
anoligopoly, the Stackelberg equilibrium is not equivalent to the static (Cournot)
equilibrium in the following cases which are not fully symmetric.
1. All firms are asymmetric, that is, they have different cost functions.
2. Two followers are symmetric, that is, they have the same cost functions.
3. The leader and one follower are symmetric.
Only if all firms are symmetric, that is, they have the same cost functions, the
Stackelberg equilibrium is equivalent to the static (Cournot) equilibrium.
2 Symmetric dynamic zero-sum game
There is a three-players and two-stages game. Players are called Player 1, Player
2 and Player 3. The strategic variable of Player i is si ; i 2 f1; 2; 3g . The set of
strategic variable of Player i is Si ; i 2 f1; 2; 3g, which is a convex and compact
set of a linear topological space. One of players is the leader and other players
are followers.
The structure of the game is as follows.
1. The first stage
The leader determines the value of its strategic variable.
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2. The second stage
Followers determine the values of their strategic variables given the value
of the leader’s strategic variable.
Thus, the game is a Stackelberg type dynamic game. We investigate a sub-game
perfect equilibrium of this game.
On the other hand, there is a static game in which three players simultane-
ously determine the values of their strategic variables.
The payoff of Player i is denoted by ui.s1; s2; s3/. ui is jointly continuous and
differentiable in si and sj ; j ¤ i . We assume
u1.s1; s2; s3/C u2.s1; s2; s3/C u3.s1; s2; s3/ D 0 given .s1; s2; s3/:
Therefore, the game is a zero-sum game.
We also assume that the game is symmetric in the sense that the payoff func-
tions of all players are symmetric, and assume that the sets of strategic variables
for all players are the same. Denote them by S .
We show the following theorem
Theorem 1. The sub-game perfect equilibrium of the Stackelberg type dynamic
zero-sum game with a leader and two followers is equivalent to the equilibrium
of the static game.
Proof. 1. The conditions for the equilibrium of the static game are
@u1.s1; s2; s3/
@s1
D 0; @u2.s1; s2; s3/
@s2
D 0; @u3.s1; s2; s3/
@s3
D 0; (1)
given .s1; s2; s3/. Since the game is symmetric, we can suppose that there
exists a symmetric equilibrium. We write it as .s; s; s/ such that s1 D
s2 D s3 D s.
The existence of a symmetric equilibrium is ensured by the fixed
point theorem. s is obtained as a fixed point of the following
function from S to S .
f .s/ D argmax
s12S
u1.s1; s; s/:
Assume that argmaxs12S u1.s1; s; s/ is single-valued. Since u1 is
continuous, f .s/ is continuous. S is compact. Therefore, f .s/ has
a fixed point.
Suppose that the leader of the dynamic game is Player 1. Players 2 and 3
are followers. In the second stage of the game Players 2 and 3 determine
their strategic variables to maximize their payoffs given the value of the
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strategic variable of Player 1. The conditions for maximization of the pay-
offs of Players 2 and 3 are
@u2.s1; s2; s3/
@s2
D 0; (2a)
and
@u3.s1; s2; s3/
@s3
D 0: (2b)
Denote the values of s2 and s3 obtained from (2a) and (2b) given s1 by
s2.s1/ and s3.s1/:
By symmetry of the game for Players 2 and 3 we have
s2.s1/ D s3.s1/;
and
u2.s1; s2.s1/; s3.s1// D u3.s1; s2.s1/; s3.s1//:
The responses of s2.s1/ and s3.s1/ to a change in s1 are written as
ds2
ds1
and ds3
ds1
:
We assume
ds2
ds1
¤ 0; ds2
ds1
¤ 1; ds3
ds1
¤ 0; ds3
ds1
¤ 1:
By symmetry, when s2 D s3 we have
ds2
ds1
D ds3
ds1
: (3)
Also, we get
@u2.s1; s2; s3/
@s2
D @u3.s1; s2; s3/
@s3
:
In the first stage of the game Player 1 determines s1 to maximize its payoff
taking the behaviors of Players 2 and 3 into account. The value of u1 with
s2.s1/ and s3.s1/ is
u1.s1; s2.s1/; s3.s1//:
The condition for maximization of u1 in the dynamic game is
@u1.s1; s2; s3/
@s1
C @u1.s1; s2; s3/
@s2
ds2
ds1
C @u1.s1; s2; s3/
@s3
ds3
ds1
D 0: (4)
By symmetry, when s2 D s3,
@u1.s1; s2; s3/
@s2
D @u1.s1; s2; s3/
@s3
:
4
From (3)
@u1.s1; s2; s3/
@s2
ds2
ds1
D @u1.s1; s2; s3/
@s3
ds3
ds1
:
Thus, (4) is rewritten as
@u1.s1; s2; s3/
@s1
C 2@u1.s1; s2; s3/
@s2
ds2
ds1
D 0: (5)
Since the game is zero-sum
u1.s1; s2; s3/C u2.s1; s2; s3/C u3.s1; s2; s3/ D 0:
This means
u1.s1; s2; s3/ D  u2.s1; s2; s3/   u3.s1; s2; s3/:
By symmetry for Players 2 and 3, when s2 D s3,
u1.s1; s2; s3/ D  2u2.s1; s2; s3/:
Thus,
@u1.s1; s2; s3/
@s1
D  2@u2.s1; s2; s3/
@s1
: (6)
2. Nowwe show that the equilibrium of the static game .s; s; s/, where s1 D
s2 D s3 D s, satisfies the conditions for the equilibrium of the Stackelberg
type dynamic game.
Suppose a state such that s1 D s2 D s3. By symmetry of the game for Players
1 and 2, s1 D s2 means
@u2.s1; s2; s3/
@s1
D @u1.s1; s2; s3/
@s2
; (7)
given s3. From (6) and (7)
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@u1.s1; s2; s3/
@s2
D  @u1.s1; s2; s3/
@s1
:
Substituting this into (5) yields,
@u1.s1; s2; s3/
@s1
  @u1.s1; s2; s3/
@s1
ds2
ds1
D 0:
Thus,
@u1.s1; s2; s3/
@s1

1   ds2
ds1

D 0
We get
@u1.s1; s2; s3/
@s1
D 0;
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because ds2
ds1
¤ 1. Therefore, from (2a) and (2b), this means
@u1.s1; s2; s3/
@s1
D 0; @u2.s1; s2; s3/
@s2
D 0; @u3.s1; s2; s3/
@s3
D 0:
Since this is equivalent to (1), the equilibrium of the static game .s; s; s/
satisfies the conditions for the equilibriumof the Stackelberg typedynamic
game.
If the game is not symmetric for Players 1 and 2, (7) does not hold, and
then the equilibrium of the dynamic game and that of the static game are
not equivalent.
3 Example: relative profit maximization in a
Stackelberg oligopoly
In the example in this section we consider relative profit maximization in an
oligopoly1.
3.1 Case 1: three firms are different each other
Consider a three firms Stackelberg oligopoly with a homogeneous good. There
are Firms A, B and C. The outputs of the firms are xA, xB and xC . The price of
the good is p. The inverse demand function is
p D a   xA   xB   xC ; a > 0:
The cost functions of the firms are cAxA, cBxB and cCxC . cA, cB and cC are positive
constants. We assume that cA, cB and cC are different each other. The relative
profit of Firm A is
'A D pxA   cAxA   1
2
.pxB   cBxB C pxC   cCxC /:
The relative profit of Firm B is
'B D pxB   cBxB   1
2
.pxA   cAxA C pxC   cCxC /:
The relative profit of Firm C is
'C D pxC   cCxC   1
2
.pxA   cAxA C pxB   cBxB/:
1About relative profitmaximization in anoligopoly please see Satoh andTanaka (2014a), Satoh
and Tanaka (2014b), Matsumura, Matsushima and Cato (2013) and Vega-Redondo (1997).
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The firms maximize their relative profits. We see
'A C 'B C 'C D 0:
Thus, the game is a zero-sum game. Firm A is the leader and Firms B and C are
followers. In the first stage of the game FirmA determines xA, and in the second
stage Firms B and C determine xB and xC given xA.
Nash equilibrium of the static game
The equilibrium outputs are
xA D 3a   5cA C cB C cC
9
; xB D 3a   5cB C cA C cC
9
; xC D 3a   5cC C cA C cB
9
:
Sub-game perfect equilibrium of the dynamic game
The equilibrium outputs are
xA D 24a   50cA C 13cB C 13cC
72
;
xB D 24a   41cB C 10cA C 7cC
72
;
and
xC D 24a   41cC C 10cA C 7cB
72
:
The Nash equilibrium of the static game and the sub-game perfect equilib-
rium of the dynamic game are not equivalent.
3.2 Case 2: the leader and one follower are symmetric
Assume cB D cA.
Nash equilibrium of the static game
The equilibrium outputs are
xA D 3a   4cA C cC
9
; xB D 3a   4cA C cC
9
; xC D 3a   5cC C 2cA
9
:
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Sub-game perfect equilibrium of the dynamic game
The equilibrium outputs are
xA D 24a   37cA C 13cC
72
;
xB D 24a   31cA C 7cC
72
;
and
xC D 24a   41cC C 17cA
72
:
The Nash equilibrium of the static game and the sub-game perfect equilib-
rium of the dynamic game are not equivalent.
3.3 Case 3: two followers are symmetric
Assume cC D cB .
Nash equilibrium of the static game
The equilibrium outputs are
xA D 3a   5cA C 2cB
9
; xB D 3a   4cB C cA
9
; xC D 3a   4cB C cA
9
:
Sub-game perfect equilibrium of the dynamic game
The equilibrium outputs are
xA D 12a   25cA C 13cB
36
;
xB D 12a   17cB C 5cA
36
;
and
xC D 12a   17cB C 5cA
36
:
The Nash equilibrium of the static game and the sub-game perfect equilib-
rium of the dynamic game are not equivalent.
3.4 Case 4: all firms are symmetric
Assume cB D cC D cA.
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Nash equilibrium of the static game
The equilibrium outputs are
xA D a   cA
3
; xB D a   cA
3
; xC D a   cA
3
:
Sub-game perfect equilibrium of the dynamic game
The equilibrium outputs are
xA D a   cA
3
; xB D a   cA
3
; xC D a   cA
3
:
The Nash equilibrium of the static game and the sub-game perfect equilib-
rium of the dynamic game are equivalent.
4 Concluding Remark
As we said in the introduction, the equivalence of the Stackelberg type dynamic
game and the static game in a two-players zero-sum game is a widely known
result. But, this problem in a multi-players case has not been analyzed. In this
paperwehave analyzed a three-players gameanda casewhere payoff functions
are differentiable. In the future research we want to extend the analysis in
this paper to more general n-players zero-sum game, and want to prove the
equivalence of the dynamic game and the static game when payoff functions
are not assumed to be differentiable.
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